Dopamine, Affordance and Active Inference by Friston, Karl J. et al.
Dopamine, Affordance and Active Inference
Karl J. Friston
1*, Tamara Shiner
1, Thomas FitzGerald
1, Joseph M. Galea
2, Rick Adams
1, Harriet Brown
1,
Raymond J. Dolan
1, Rosalyn Moran
1, Klaas Enno Stephan
1, Sven Bestmann
2
1The Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, Queen Square, London, United Kingdom, 2Sobell Department of Motor Neuroscience and
Movement Disorders, University College London Institute of Neurology, Queen Square, London, United Kingdom
Abstract
The role of dopamine in behaviour and decision-making is often cast in terms of reinforcement learning and optimal
decision theory. Here, we present an alternative view that frames the physiology of dopamine in terms of Bayes-optimal
behaviour. In this account, dopamine controls the precision or salience of (external or internal) cues that engender action. In
other words, dopamine balances bottom-up sensory information and top-down prior beliefs when making hierarchical
inferences (predictions) about cues that have affordance. In this paper, we focus on the consequences of changing tonic
levels of dopamine firing using simulations of cued sequential movements. Crucially, the predictions driving movements are
based upon a hierarchical generative model that infers the context in which movements are made. This means that we can
confuse agents by changing the context (order) in which cues are presented. These simulations provide a (Bayes-optimal)
model of contextual uncertainty and set switching that can be quantified in terms of behavioural and electrophysiological
responses. Furthermore, one can simulate dopaminergic lesions (by changing the precision of prediction errors) to produce
pathological behaviours that are reminiscent of those seen in neurological disorders such as Parkinson’s disease. We use
these simulations to demonstrate how a single functional role for dopamine at the synaptic level can manifest in different
ways at the behavioural level.
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Introduction
This article is about set switching and action selection during
the execution of cued responses. It offers a straightforward account
of dopamine in optimising behaviour in the context of (Bayes-
optimal) predictive coding. Our focus is on the consequences of
depleting dopamine and simulating perseveration that is charac-
teristic of Parkinson’s disease, using synthetic neuronal models
based upon active inference [1]. In brief, the emergent role of
dopamine is to report the precision or salience of perceptual cues
that portend a predictable sequence of sensorimotor events. In this
sense, it mediates the affordance of cues that elicit motor
behaviour [2]; in much the same way that attention mediates
the salience of cues in the perceptual domain. Gibson defined
affordances as action possibilities latent in the environment [3],
objectively measurable and independent of the ability to recognize
them but always in relation to the actor [4]. Affordance is
therefore an attribute of a cue and has to be inferred. Crucially, in
this paper, inferring that an object has affordance necessarily
entails an action. We hope to establish a central role for dopamine
in this inference and implicit action selection.
Dopamine has been implicated in a bewildering variety of
processes and pathologies in the human brain; ranging from
cortical excitability to attentional deficits [5], [6]; from motor
control to akinesia and set switching deficits in Parkinson’s disease
[7], [8], [9]; from working memory to schizophrenia [10], [11];
from reinforcement learning to addiction [12], [13]; from
executive function to age-related cognitive decline [14]; from
reward prediction to failures of incentive salience [15], [16]; from
exploration to psychomotor poverty [17]. In fact, it is difficult to
find an area of neuroscience that does not implicate dopamine; for
example, it has key roles in mood, sleep, nociception, and
prolactin production. In terms of its functional or computational
roles, it has been suggested that dopamine reports reward
prediction errors, hedonic value, incentive salience, novelty, and
so on. Many accounts appeal to optimal decision theory and
reinforcement learning to understand the putative role of
dopamine in formal terms [18], [19], [20], [21]. These treatments
rest on the assumption that behaviour is optimal in relation to
some reward or cost function and invoke various heuristics from
control theory (e.g., dynamic programming) to explain the
computational role of dopamine.
This article takes a different view and considers that behaviour
is Bayes-optimal in the sense that it maximises the Bayesian
evidence for an actor’s model of the world or, equivalently,
minimises surprise. We have formulated this as active inference in a
series of previous papers [1], [22], [23]. Active inference can be
seen as an embodied (enactivist) form of predictive coding, in
which perception minimises exteroceptive prediction errors and
action minimises proprioceptive prediction errors. Put simply,
active inference is predictive coding with classical motor reflexes.
In this setting, cost functions are replaced by surprise or prediction
error, in the sense that the only optimal behaviour is a behaviour
that brings about expected outcomes (i.e., minimises surprise as
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harmful or surprising exchanges with the environment and equips
them with a physiological and ethological homoeostasis. Note that
this does impose constraints on behaviour, since appropriate priors
can replicate the effect of any cost function [1]. In short, rewards
are just familiar sensory states. This perspective has three
advantages over reward-based accounts: first, it resolves the
tautology inherent in the notion of reward. This tautology follows
from the fact that reward is used to explain reward seeking
behaviour [24], while at the same time being defined in terms of its
ability to elicit reward seeking behaviour. Second, it dispenses with
the intractable solutions of control theory problems (e.g., Bellman
optimality equations) that are necessary to optimise reward or cost
functions [25], [26], [27]. Finally, and central to this paper, it
provides a novel perspective on the role of dopamine that accounts
for its apparently diverse roles in terms of a single mechanism,
operating at different levels of the sensorimotor hierarchy.
The Bayesian perspective suggests that there are only two sorts
of things that need to be inferred about the world; namely, the
state of the world and uncertainty about that state. We have
suggested that predicted states of the world are encoded in terms of
synaptic activity, while uncertainty is encoded by synaptic gain
that encodes the precision (inverse amplitude or variance) of
random fluctuations about predicted states [28]. If true, this means
that modulators of synaptic gain (like dopamine) do not report
perceptual content but the context in which percepts are formed.
In other words, dopamine reports the precision or salience of
sensorimotor constructs (representations) encoded by the activity
of the synapses they modulate. This leads to a view of
dopaminergic projections that select salient processing channels
and associated actions. Physiologically, this is compatible with
short latency dopamine bursts in the basal ganglia that occur after
any salient event, whether rewarding or not [29]. In this view,
dopaminergic discharges do not signify reward prediction errors
but are an integral part of Bayes-optimal perception and
sensorimotor integration: they respond to salient or precise cues
that portend a predictable sequence of sensorimotor events that
will be registered by specific proprioceptive and exteroceptive
processing channels. Crucially, these responses will appear to be
reward-related, because they precede sensorimotor sequences that
lead to a rewarding (familiar) state. In other words, if a sequence of
choices is predictable they lead to unsurprising outcomes, which
are, by definition, rewarding. However, the agent may have no
concept or representation of reward; it is just doing what it expects
to do in the context established by the pattern of dopamine firing.
The motivation and mechanisms behind the role of dopamine
considered in this paper are exactly the same as we have proposed
for the attentional modulation of postsynaptic gain in sensory
processing [30]. Both attentional modulation and dopaminergic
gating may represent a Bayes-optimal encoding of precision that
enhances the processing of particular sensory representations by
selectively biasing bottom-up sensory information (prediction
errors). In other words, it confers salience on attended represen-
tations [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37]. The specific role of
dopaminergic neurotransmission in behaviour (as opposed to
perception) may be explained by the regional specificity of its
projection fields (and postsynaptic receptor subtypes) that are
mainly confined to cortical and subcortical structures concerned
with predicting choices and motor responses [38]. This is
important because it means that dopamine may be exclusively
concerned with salient representations that have affordance; in
other words, sensorimotor representations that predict both
perceptual and behavioural consequences. If true, this means
dopamine has a crucial role in biasing sensorimotor integration
and action selection. More formally, dopamine is in a position to
select the proprioceptive and exteroceptive signals (prediction
errors) that compete for higher level explanation by controlling
their precision. This formulation sits comfortably with the
affordance competition hypothesis [2], [39] and other theoretical
accounts: for example, the uncertainty processing theory of
motivation [40], neurobiological accounts of decision-making
[41], [42] and the plurality of roles suggested by the physiology
of dopamine [43]. In particular, it draws on the same notions that
link dopamine to the encoding of uncertainty [44] and adaptive
responses to changes in neuronal signal to noise levels [45], [46].
This is because precision represents uncertainty due to random
fluctuations or noise. By associating salience with precision we can
also connect to constructs like incentive salience in psychology [47]
and aberrant salience in psychopathology [48]. Indeed, it has been
shown that action selection can be cast as signal selection using
salience to report the ‘‘propensity for selecting a given action’’
[49]. Note that precision or salience is an attribute of a
(probabilistic) representation that determines the confidence or
certainty about what is represented; where the salience of sensory
representations can be manipulated experimentally, by changing
signal to noise levels or contrast. We will see an example of this
later. Finally, the notion that dopamine modulates synaptic gain
plays a key role in several proposals. It has been argued for in [50]
and used in several Parkinson’s disease modelling papers [51,52].
In this paper, the hypothesis that dopamine release reports
precision or uncertainty is based purely on its synaptic physiology.
However, there is definitive neurophysiological evidence for this
role of dopamine [44], where, for example, dopaminergic
discharges covary with the variance or precision of juice rewards
[53]. More generally, nearly every experimental manipulation
evoking dopaminergic responses (novelty, unexpected rewards, etc)
speaks to a change in the level of precision or confidence about
subsequent contingencies. In what follows, we try to substantiate
the above ideas using theoretical arguments based upon active
inference and then illustrate their plausibility using simulations of
cued responses. These simulations are concerned with the
Author Summary
Dopamine is a neurotransmitter that has been implicated
in a wide variety of cognitive and motor functions; it is
depleted in Parkinson’s disease, disrupted in schizophrenia
and plays a central role in working memory, reinforcement
learning and other cognitive functions. In this paper,
we present a straightforward and neurophysiologically
grounded explanation for the diversity of functions and
pathologies that implicate dopamine. This explanation
rests on a principled approach to the nature of action and
perception called active inference. This approach suggests
that (Bayes) optimal perception and consequent behaviour
depends on representing uncertainty about states of the
world in terms of the precision (inverse amplitude) of their
random fluctuations. Crucially, this uncertainly can be
encoded by the same postsynaptic gain of neurons that is
modulated by dopamine. This means that changing the
levels of dopamine changes the level of uncertainty about
different representations. To substantiate this idea, we
simulate dopamine depletion in a hierarchical sensorimo-
tor network to show that a single function of dopamine
(encoding precision in terms of postsynaptic gain) is not
only sufficient to account for commonly observed
behaviours following dopamine depletion but also pro-
vides a unifying perspective on many existing theories
about dopamine.
Active Inference and Affordance
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 2 January 2012 | Volume 8 | Issue 1 | e1002327consequences of depleting dopaminergic neurotransmission to
illustrate its central role in action selection and set switching. They
can therefore be regarded as a very simple model of Parkinson’s
disease. This means we will not address changes in precision but
assume that the tonic activity of dopaminergic neurons encodes a
fixed level of precision or uncertainty [44], [43], [45]. Subsequent
papers will focus on the control of (phasic and tonic) dopaminergic
responses per se and will try to reproduce the empirical findings of
behavioural reinforcement paradigms, using phasic dopamine
discharges that shift striatial neurons into an up state to increase
their gain or precision [54]. Furthermore, we will restrict our
discussion to the generic effect of dopamine on postsynaptic D1
receptors located on principal cells throughout the brain [55]. This
necessarily precludes a proper consideration of the balance
between D1 and D2 receptor function and its relationship to the
functional anatomy of the basal ganglia in Parkinson’s disease
[56].
The models and methods section reviews the theory on which
subsequent simulations are based. This section presents a brief
review of the free energy principle, with a special focus on active
inference and the role of synaptic gain in encoding precision. The
basic theory and ensuing differential equations used to simulate
neuronal responses are exactly the same as those used to illustrate
perceptual inference, learning, attention and action in a series of
previous papers (Table 1). This formalism is then used to model
sequential cued movements, under normal and, in the results
section, depleted levels of dopamine. The particular simulations
used in this paper rest on prior beliefs about sensorimotor
trajectories, encoded by itinerant (wandering) dynamics in
premotor cortex. These dynamics are entrained by prediction
errors from the superior colliculus, the parietal cortex and motor
cortex, whose precision is, we assume, controlled by dopamine.
Using this architecture, we can simulate visually cued sequences of
movements and, crucially, responses to sequence violations. By
adding a further (prefrontal) level to the model, we examine how
the ability to switch from one sequence to another is compromised
when sensorimotor cues lose precision. The resulting impact on set
switching is characterised in terms of (synthetic) neuronal
responses and behavioural (reaction time and accuracy) measures.
We conclude with a discussion of the implications for dopamine in
motor control and set switching generally, and for Parkinson’s
disease specifically.
Methods
Active inference, affordance and free energy
In this section, we briefly overview the free energy principle and
active inference to frame the role of dopamine examined later.
The free energy principle proposes that the states and infrastruc-
ture of a self organising system, such as the brain, should minimise
the free energy of the sensory states it samples [57]. Free energy is
an upper bound on the surprise associated with sensory signals,
where surprise is mathematically the same as the (negative log)
Bayesian evidence for the system’s model of its world. Evidence is
just the probability of getting some data under the model of those
data. This means that minimising free energy reduces surprising
exchanges with the environment or, equivalently, maximises the
evidence for an agent’s internal model of its sensorium. This
principle entails two corollaries; the Bayesian brain hypothesis
[58], [59]; [60], [61] and active inference [1], [22], [23]. The
Bayesian brain hypothesis means that the brain will try to predict
its sensory inputs in a Bayes-optimal fashion by representing their
causes in terms of hidden states of the world. Active inference
equips the Bayesian brain with motor reflex arcs that ensure its
predictions are fulfilled (by suppressing proprioceptive prediction
errors). In active inference, behaviour emerges as natural
consequence of high-level representations (sensorimotor con-
structs) that have both sensory (exteroceptive) and motor
(proprioceptive) consequences. These constructs or representations
are maintained by bottom-up prediction errors in both modalities
and reciprocate top-down (proprioceptive) predictions to the
peripheral motor system that drive classical motor reflexes; while
top-down predictions to sensory systems play the role of corollary
discharge and suppress (exteroceptive) prediction errors.
Crucially, high-level sensorimotor representations can be
dynamic in nature, with itinerant dynamics (on attractor
manifolds) that embody prior beliefs about the sequence of
sensorimotor events or trajectories that will unfold in the near
future. These can be regarded as central pattern generators or
attractors that provide proprioceptive and sensory predictions for
sensorimotor integration; in other words, representations of
affordance [23]. The particular sequence currently active depends
upon which attractor has been selected. This selection rests upon
precise bottom-up prediction errors conveying salient sensory
information that has yet to be explained. In this scheme,
prediction errors can induce or destroy metastable attractors at
higher levels to select the trajectory that best explains sensory
input. This can be regarded as selecting an attractor with an
affordance that best explains sensory input; cf., ‘‘affordance
competition’’ in [2]. The potency with which ascending prediction
errors can select the appropriate attractor depends upon their
postsynaptic gain. This gain encodes the precision (inverse
variance) of random fluctuations about predictions. In other
words, the ability of bottom-up prediction errors to bias
competition among high level sensorimotor representations
(attractors) depends upon their precision that we presume, in this
paper, is modulated by dopamine. In the results section, we will
see an example of these dynamics and what happens when the
precision of prediction errors is reduced by (simulating) a
reduction in dopaminergic neurotransmission. We hypothesised
that this would result in a failure of set switching and the
perseveration of sensorimotor dynamics of the sort seen in
Parkinson’s disease [7], [62], [63]. In what follows, we will unpack
the above summary in slightly more formal terms:
Table 1. Processes and paradigms that have been modeled
using the scheme in this paper.
Domain Process or paradigm
Perception Perceptual categorization (bird songs) [70]
Novelty and omission-related responses [70]
Sensory learning Perceptual learning (mismatch negativity) [139]
Attention Attention and the Posner paradigm [30]
Attention and biased competition [30]
Motor control Retinal stabilization and oculomotor reflexes [22]
Saccadic eye movements and cued reaching [22]
Motor trajectories and place cells [23]
Sensorimotor integration Bayes-optimal sensorimotor integration [22]
Behavior Heuristics and dynamical systems theory [140]
Goal-directed behavior [1]
Action observation Action observation and mirror neurons [23]
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002327.t001
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The equations and simulations used in this paper may appear a
bit complicated and ad hoc; however, they are based on just three
assumptions:
N The brain minimises the free energy of sensory inputs defined
by a generative model.
N The generative model used by the brain is hierarchical,
nonlinear and dynamic.
N Neuronal firing rates encode the most likely state of the world,
under this model.
The first assumption is the free energy principle, which leads to
active inference when considering both representations and action.
This principle has to be true, in the sense that a failure to minimise
free energy means that the brain will entertain increasingly
surprising sensations and, at some point, will cease to exist in an
ergodic sense. The second assumption is motivated easily by
noting that the world is both dynamic and nonlinear. Hierarchical
causal structure emerges inevitably from a separation of temporal
scales. This can be seen most clearly in the slaving principle from
statistical physics [64,65], where slow ordered dynamics emerge at
a macroscopic scale and enslave fast fluctuations at a microscopic
scale. Finally, the third assumption follows from the first, under the
constraint that probabilistic representations are encoded by a
minimum number of biophysical variables. This leads to
something called the Laplace assumption, in which the probability
density function over hidden states is Gaussian and can be
encoded by its mean or expectation. In terms of neural codes, this
is referred to this as the Laplace code and is arguably the simplest
and most flexible of all neural codes [66].
Given these three assumptions, one can simulate a whole variety
of situations and processes by simply specifying the particular
equations that constitute the generative model. The resulting
perception and action is specified completely by the above
assumptions and can be implemented in a biologically plausible
way as described in previous applications listed in Table 1. In brief,
these simulations use differential equations that minimise the free
energy of sensory input using a generalised gradient descent [67].
_ ~ m m ~ m m~D~ m m{
L
L~ m m
Fm(~ s s,~ m m)
_ a a~{
L
La
Fm(~ s s,~ m m)
ð1Þ
These coupled differential equations describe perception and action
respectively and just say that internal brain states and action change
in the direction that reduces free energy. The first is known as
(generalised) predictive coding and has the same form as Bayesian
(e.g., Kalman-Bucy) filters used in time series analysis; see also [68].
The free energy Fm(~ s s,~ m m) depends on three things; sensory signals
~ s s(t), conditional expectations or representations ~ m m(t) and a model
m. The model defines how expectations about states of the world
conspire to produce sensory input. In neurobiological formulations,
these expectations or predictions are associated with neuronal
activity and the model comprises a connectivity or network
architecture. The,notation denotes variables in generalised
coordinates of motion that include velocity, acceleration, jerk and
so on; ~ m m~½m,m’,m’’,... 
T. The first term in Equation 1 is a
prediction based upon a matrix differential operator D that
returns the generalised motion of the expectation, such that
D~ m m~½m’,m’’,m’’’,... 
T. The second term is usually expressed as a
mixture of prediction errors that ensures the changes in conditional
expectations are Bayes-optimal predictions about hidden states of the
world. The second differential equation says that action also mini-
mises free energy. The differential equations are coupled because
sensory input depends upon action, which depends upon perception
through the conditional expectations. This circular dependency leads
to a sampling of sensory input that is both predicted and predictable,
thereby minimising free energy and surprise.
To perform neuronal simulations under this framework it is only
necessary to integrate or solve Equation 1 to simulate neuronal
dynamics that encode the conditional predictions and ensuing
action. Conditional predictions depend upon the brain’s genera-
tive model of the world, which we assume has the following
(hierarchical) form
s(t)~f (1,v)(x(1),v(1))zv(1,v)(x(1),v(1))
_ x x(1)~f (1,x)(x(1),v(1))zv(1,x)(x(1),v(1))
. .
.
v(i{1)~f (i,v)(x(i),v(i))zv(i,v)(x(i),v(i))
_ x x(i)~f (i,x)(x(i),v(i))zv(i,x)(x(i),v(i))
ð2Þ
This equation is just a way of writing down a model that relates
various quantities in the world probabilistically in terms of their
generalised motion. Here, (f (i,x),f (i,v)) are nonlinear functions of
hidden states and causes (x(t),v(t)) that generate sensory inputs
s(t) at the first (lowest) level. Random fluctuations (v(i,x),v(i,v)) on
the motion of hidden states and causes are conditionally
independent and enter each level of the hierarchy. It is these that
make the model probabilistic. They play the role of sensory noise
at the first level and induce uncertainty about states at higher
levels. The (inverse) amplitudes of these random fluctuations are
quantified by their precisions; (~ P P(i,x),~ P P(i,v)), which we assume to
be fixed in this paper and encoded by dopamine. Hidden causes
v(t)~(v(1),v(2),:...) link hierarchical levels, whereas hidden states
x(t)~(x(1),x(2),:...) link dynamics over time. Hidden states and
causes are abstract quantities (like the motion of an object in the
field of view) that the brain uses to explain or predict sensations. In
this hierarchical model, the output of one level acts as an input to
the next. This input can produce complicated (generalised)
convolutions with deep (hierarchical) structure. We will see an
example of this later.
Perception and action under predictive coding
Given the form of the generative model (Equation 2) we can
now write down the differential equations (Equation 1) describing
neuronal dynamics in terms of (precision-weighted) prediction
errors on the hidden causes and states (~ e e(i,x),~ e e(i,v)). These errors
represent the difference between conditional expectations
(~ m m(i,x),~ m m(i,v)) and predicted values, under the generative model:
_ ~ m m ~ m m
(i,v)
~D~ m m(i,v)z
L~ f f (i,v)
L~ m m(i,v)
 ! T
~ e e(i,v)z
L~ f f (i,x)
L~ m m(i,v)
 ! T
~ e e(i,x){~ e e(iz1,v)
_ ~ m m ~ m m
(i,x)
~D~ m m(i,x)z
L~ f f (i,v)
L~ m m(i,x)
 ! T
~ e e(i,v)z
L~ f f (i,x)
L~ m m(i,x)
 ! T
~ e e(i,x){DT~ e e(i,x)
~ e e(i,v)~~ P P(i,v)(~ m m(i{1,v){~ f f (i,v))
~ e e(i,x)~~ P P(i,x)(D~ m m(i,x){~ f f (i,x))
ð3Þ
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replaced by sensory input. This equation can be derived fairly
easily by computing the free energy for the hierarchical model in
Equation 2 and inserting its gradients into Equation 1. What we
end up with is a relatively simple update scheme, in which
conditional expectations are driven by a mixture of prediction
errors, where prediction errors are defined by the equations of the
generative model.
It is difficult to overstate the generality and importance of
Equation 3: its solutions grandfather nearly every known statistical
estimation scheme, under parametric assumptions about additive
or multiplicative noise [69]. These range from ordinary least
squares to advanced variational deconvolution schemes. The
resulting scheme is called generalised filtering or generalised
predictive coding [67]. In neural network terms, Equation 3 says
that error-units receive predictions from the same level and the
level above. Conversely, prediction-units are driven by prediction
errors from the same level and the level below. These constitute
bottom-up and lateral messages that drive conditional expectations
towards a better prediction to reduce the prediction error in the
level below. This is the essence of recurrent message passing
between hierarchical levels to optimise free energy or suppress
prediction error: see [70], for a more detailed discussion. In
neurobiological implementations of this scheme, the sources of
bottom-up prediction errors, in the cortex, are thought to be
superficial pyramidal cells that send forward connections to higher
cortical areas. Conversely, predictions are conveyed from deep
pyramidal cells, by backward connections, to target (polysynapti-
cally) the superficial pyramidal cells encoding prediction error
[71], [70]. The laminar specificity of the cells of origin of
predictions and prediction errors becomes relevant when exam-
ining the putative role of dopamine in the encoding of precision.
The neurobiology of precision
Equation 3 shows that precision modulates the responses of
prediction error units to their presynaptic inputs. Here, we
associate precision with dopaminergic neuromodulation of these
responses. The action of dopamine is mediated by a family of
transmembrane G protein-coupled receptors [72] encoded by at
least five dopamine receptor genes [73]. Dopamine receptors are
found throughout the soma and dendrites of neurons but ultra-
structural and biochemical evidence suggests that they are
concentrated in dendritic spines that express glutamatergic
synapses [74], [75]. Postsynaptic D1 and D2 receptors are
therefore strategically positioned to control the excitability and
synaptic properties of spines ‘‘with remarkable precision and
versatility’’ [76].
Although dopamine appears to be a natural candidate to
modulate principal cells reporting prediction error, Equation 3
does not tell us whether prediction errors are modulated before or
after they are computed. Both mechanisms are biologically
plausible: for example, superficial pyramidal cells encoding
prediction error could be modulated by D1 receptors on the
soma or initial segment, after the integration of signals subtending
prediction errors in the dendritic tree. Conversely, precision
dependent modulation could be applied at a synaptic level to all
presynaptic inputs. For dopamine, the balance of evidence points
to the latter mechanism [77]:
Dopamine innervation in the human prefrontal cortex exhibits
a distinct bilaminar distribution with dense bands of fibres in the
superficial and deep layers [78], [74]. Although some evidence
suggests that dopaminergic markers are more concentrated in
deep layers [79], [80], other studies report a higher concentration
in supragranular layers [81]. These differences may be due to
regional and species differences [82]. Here, we will focus on
dopaminergic modulation of cells in the supragranular layers,
because superficial pyramidal cells are thought to report prediction
error [71]. Dopamine axons form symmetric synapses, predom-
inantly on the spines of pyramidal cells. In many cases, the same
spine expresses an asymmetric (excitatory) synapse. In human and
monkey prefrontal cortex, the dopamine D1-specific ligand, 3H-
SCH23390, and the D2-specific ligand, H3-raclopride, label
binding sites that mirror the densest dopamine innervation [78],
[83]. This suggests that the primary role of D1 receptors is to
modulate presynaptic input to pyramidal cells at the dendritic level
[77], [74]. In terms of the implicit computational architecture, we
can therefore assume that dopamine gates or modulates the
dendritic responses of superficial pyramidal cells, such that
dopamine selects afferents encoding sensory information (predic-
tion error) in proportion to its precision.
Figure 1 provides a schematic of the neuronal circuitry implied
by this assumption, in which dopamine modulates doubly-
innervated spines of superficial pyramidal cells receiving excitatory
and inhibitory presynaptic inputs [84]; corresponding to condi-
tional expectations and their predictions respectively. The
opposing effects of these presynaptic inputs on postsynaptic
depolarisation form a prediction error signal that is modulated
at the level of the dendritic spine by dopamine. In this scheme, the
tonic firing of a particular dopaminergic cell or population
encodes the precision or salience of the information (prediction
error) conveyed by the cells that it targets. One might imagine that
phasic discharges report changes in the current context and signal
a change in the relative precision (uncertainty) over different
sensory channels and conditional predictions. In this paper, we will
assume that the precision at each hierarchical level is constant and
address the (phasic) control of dopaminergic activity in terms of
optimisation of (state-dependent) precision elsewhere.
Action and affordance
Clearly, in sensorimotor hierarchies [85], the relative levels of
neuromodulatory gating (precision) at different levels can have a
profound effect on perception and behaviour, because it will select
particular processing channels and change the balance between
bottom-up sensory information and top-down prior expectations.
In hierarchical models, these prior expectations are called empirical
priors, because they are optimised in relation to sensory data.
Furthermore, precision or neuromodulation of synaptic gain will
affect action and motor control, because action is driven by
(proprioceptive) prediction errors at the sensory level that have
their own gain or precision:
_ a a~{
L
La
Fm~{
L~ s s
La
   T
~ P P(1,v)~ e e(1,v) ð4Þ
This follows because the only way that action can minimise free
energy is to change sensory prediction errors by selecting which
sensory signals are sampled. As noted above, the ensuing
suppression of proprioceptive prediction errors can be thought
of in terms of classical motor reflex arcs: see [22] for details.
Affordance is generally conceived of as the opportunities for
action offered by the environment to an agent [4]. This depends
on both the environment and the nature of the actor. For example,
an axe only affords the possibility of use when it can be wielded. In
this paper, affordance is an attribute of amodal representations at
higher hierarchical levels that make both sensory and motor
predictions (an ‘axe’ entails predictions not only about how it looks
or feels, but also the kinaesthetic consequences of wielding it).
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behaviour by sending top-down predictions down the hierarchy
that are unpacked into proprioceptive predictions at the level of
the cranial nerve nuclei and spinal-cord. These engage classical
reflex arcs to produce the predicted motor trajectory. The action
of dopamine in this context is to modulate or enable the salience of
representations that have affordance, and hence the probability
they will be enacted.
Summary
In summary, we have derived equations for the dynamics of
perception and action using a free energy formulation of adaptive
(Bayes-optimal) exchanges with the world and a generative model
that is both generic and biologically plausible. In what follows, we
use Equations 3 and 4 to simulate neuronal and behavioural
responses. A technical treatment of the material above will be
found in [67], which provides the details of the scheme used to
integrate (solve) Equation 1 to produce the simulations considered
next.
A generative model of cued responses
The preceding scheme allows one to simulate (Bayes-optimal)
responses in terms of neuronal activity and motor behaviour,
under any plausible generative model. Here, we consider a
particular model, described in terms of the functions in Equation 2
that leads to a sequence of pointing movements, elicited by a
sequence of visual cues. This model of sensorimotor integration
provides the basis for simple simulated lesion experiments, in
which we can deplete levels of simulated dopamine (precision) in
different parts of the brain, and examine the consequences.
Because the differential equations governing perception and
action are coupled (Equation 1), we need to specify two mappings:
the generative model used by the brain, whose inversion
maps from sensations to action, and the process by which action
Figure 1. This figure provides a schematic overview of the message passing scheme implied by Equation 3. In this scheme, neurons are
divided into prediction (black) and prediction error (red) units that pass messages to each other, within and between hierarchical levels. Superficial
pyramidal cells (red) send forward prediction errors to deep pyramidal cells (black), which reciprocate with predictions that are conveyed by
(polysynaptic) backward extrinsic connections. This process continues until the amplitude of prediction error has been minimized and the predictions
are optimized in a Bayesian sense. The prediction errors are the (precision weighted) difference between conditional expectations encoded at any
level and top down or lateral predictions. Note that there are prediction errors at every level of the hierarchy, for both hidden states and hidden
causes (and sensory states and the lowest level). The synaptic infrastructure proposed to mediate this comparison and subsequent modulation is
shown in the lower panel, in terms of a doubly-innervated synapse [84] that is gated by dopamine (cyan). Here, dopamine is delivered by en passant
synaptic boutons and postsynaptic D1 receptors have been located on a dendritic spine expressing asymmetric (excitatory) and symmetric
(inhibitory) synaptic connections. This represents the synaptic arrangements indicated by the cyan arrows in the upper panel.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002327.g001
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sensory information and the hidden states assumed by the
generative model, we will use bold and italic variables respectively.
Sensory input was generated using the following equations, which
constitute real world dynamics that are hidden from the agent:
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This equation specifies how hidden states in the world produce
sensory inputs and how those states change in response to action
and hidden causes. Although it may look complicated, the implicit
dynamics are very simple: The first equation expresses sensory
input as a nonlinear function of true states in the world that
comprise the position of a single jointed arm x(1)
p (t)[R
2 in terms of
vertical and horizontal angles of displacement from a resting
position x(1)
p (t)~0; and the salience x(1)
a (t)[R
4 of four locations in
extrinsic (visual) coordinates. Salience corresponds to appearance
of visual cues at the four locations that affords the possibility of
reaching towards them. These hidden states produce sensory
signals in a proprioceptive modality, sp(t)[R
2; the location of the
arm in visual coordinates, sv(t)[R
2 and the salience (e.g.,
illumination) of the four target locations sa(t)[R
4. Here, we have
used a simple tangent function to model the nonlinear transfor-
mation from intrinsic (proprioceptive) to extrinsic (visual) coordi-
nates that is inherent in real motor control [86].
The second differential equation describes how changes in arm
position and target salience depend upon action and exogenous
causes respectively: the direction of the arm changes as a sigmoid
(hyperbolic tangent) function of action and decays back to its
resting position in the absence of action. The salience of each
location is increased by exogenous causes v(1)(t)[R
4 that we can
use to specify the duration and sequence of (visual) cues. The
motion of the states and sensory input were subject to low levels of
noise in the simulations (with a log precision of 16).
Clearly, to integrate Equation 5 we need not only the exogenous
causes (that specify sequence of visual cues) but also action that
depends upon the perceptual inversion of a generative model. The
generative model here was chosen to include several features of
sensorimotor integration and hierarchical dynamics in the simplest
way possible. It considers the brain to model the sensory world as a
succession of unstable fixed points in some abstract state space. In
other words, the agent expects the world to change continuously,
with an itinerant (wandering) trajectory, visiting different states in
succession. These reflect prior beliefs about forthcoming sensory
events, and are encoded by differential equations that embody
metastable dynamics; e.g., winnerless competition; [87], [88]. The
resulting attractors can be thought of as central pattern generators
that can be nested hierarchically at different time scales [89] to
produce exteroceptive and proprioceptive (i.e., sensorimotor)
predictions. These predictions are entrained by perception and
prescribe motor responses through active inference. An important
aspect of these generative models is that high level dynamics
determine the context or set that engages lower-level sensorimotor
sequences. In what follows, we will exploit this hierarchical aspect
to illustrate some generic features of set switching and action
selection and how they depend on the delicate balance of precision
over different hierarchical levels.
The generative model used by our simulated agent had two
levels and the following form (a particular case of Equation 2):
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At the sensory level, this model has the same form as the actual
process generating sensory information (in Equation 5), with the
exception that salience is log transformed so that it can be positive
or negative (hence the exponential function in the first equality).
However, above the sensory mapping (the first equation) the form
of a model is very different from the process generating data
(Equation 5) and embodies (formal) priors that induce a dynamic
interplay between action and perception. It is this interplay that
underlies the agent’s behaviour. Crucially, the hidden states x(1)
a
not only predict visual salience but also predict changes in
proprioception. In this sense, they become affordance states. More
specifically, the second differential equation means that the agent
expects its arm to be drawn to the location specified by a function
‘:s(x(1)
a ) of hidden affordance states, where ‘[R
2|4 encodes the
location of the four targets or cues. A softmax function of hidden
affordance states s(x(1)
a ) just ensures that the hidden state with the
largest affordance predominates over the others. It is important to
note that if we did not add anything else to this generative model,
the agent would simply point to each target when it appeared; cf.,
[90]. This is because perception would infer that the affordance of
a particular target was high. The associated conditional expecta-
tions would then induce proprioceptive predictions that would be
fulfilled by action; such that the agent would point towards the
target. In an experimental setting, these prior beliefs may be
instantiated through task instructions.
However, we will consider a more sophisticated and realistic
model, in which the agent has prior beliefs about the sequence in
which targets will appear. This sort of prior belief could be
instantiated by repeated exposure to the same sequence. These
prior beliefs are encoded by the function s(x(1)
a ,
1
2
v
(1)
1 ) that
prescribes a stable heteroclinic channel or winnerless competition
among hidden affordance states. In other words, the agent believes
that the affordance of the four target locations will change
continuously, where each of the four states rises in turn, exciting
the next state and suppressing itself (see Figure 2). The speed of
these sequential dynamics is governed by the hidden cause v
(1)
1 .I f
we stopped here, we would have a simple agent with a limited
repertoire of expectations that comprised a fixed sequence of
sensorimotor events. These expectations may be consistent with
the actual order of cues encountered or they may not be.
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that cues may or may not be ordered. We model this in terms of
the hidden cause that controls the speed of the sequence.
Crucially, this hidden cause is itself a softmax function of a
hidden state that is part of a slower itinerant cycle (by factor of
eight), governed by the same winnerless competition among the
hidden states; x(2)[R
2. This means that, depending upon the
second level hidden states; the sequential dynamics of the hidden
affordances at the first level may or may not be engaged. The
resulting model may sound complicated; however, its complexity
lies in labelling various states of the model. The actual form of the
model is both mathematically quite simple and biologically
plausible: we have just placed a slow pattern generator on top of
a fast pattern generator and have then mapped to sensory
consequences. Both pattern generators have the same universal
form and show autonomous, metastable dynamics of the sort seen
in the real brain [87].
In summary, the agent believes that it will point towards salient
cues when they appear. Furthermore, it believes that these cues
would appear one at a time; either in a fixed (clockwise) sequence
or with no sequential contingencies. Although this is a very simple
model of the world, it allows us to demonstrate sensorimotor
integration in the context of cued motor actions, biasing of action
selection in terms of sequential anticipations and set switching that
depends upon recognising the context (sequential or random) in
which cues appear. Our particular interest here is in how
manipulating the precision (dopamine) at various levels in this
hierarchical model will impact on cued responses. The interesting
behaviour depends entirely upon the prior beliefs entailed by the
form of the generative model and its equations of motion. These
are shown schematically in Figure 3, which highlights the
difference between the structured and dynamical expectations
implicit in the generative model (left panels) and the relatively
simple dynamics underlying the generation of sensory input (right
panels). This emphasises the fact that real behaviour emerges
through the expectations and active sampling of the environment
that an agent brings to the world: expectations that are embodied
in its generative model. It should be emphasised, that despite the
complexity of these models, perception and action can be
accounted for by one straightforward principle; namely the
minimisation of free energy, as in Equation 1.
If we substitute the generative model in Equation 6 into the
message passing (generalised predictive coding) scheme in
Equation 3, we arrived at the network architecture shown in
Figure 4. To lend this architecture a neurobiological plausibility,
we have assigned the prediction and error units to neuronal
populations in various cortical and subcortical structures. At the
sensory level, we have placed sensory prediction error in extrinsic
(visual) coordinates in the parietal cortex and the salience (e.g.,
illumination) of the four target locations in the superior colliculus;
Figure 2. This figure provides a schematic overview of winnerless competition. These itinerant (wandering) dynamics are used to model
sequential neuronal dynamics that, in this paper, encode prior beliefs about sequential changes in hidden states (e.g., affordance). Technically, these
dynamics comprise stable heteroclinic channels or cycles that connect unstable fixed points. The fixed points are the colored dots in the upper left
diagram. Each unstable fixed point is attractive in one dimension and repelling in another, expelling the state x[R
4 so that it is captured by the next
unstable fixed point and so. A common example of these dynamics is provided by predator-prey relationships modeled with Lotka-Volterra equations
of motion, denoted by s(x,v) in the lower panel. The speed with which the fixed points are visited is controlled by a variable v that scales the
elements in a transition matrix A(v), which couples the attractor states. In this paper, the attractor states are mapped to fixed locations in an extrinsic
(physical) frame of reference to encode their affordance, using a softmax function of the attractor states s(x) and a matrix ‘[R
2|4, encoding their
locations. This means that the orbit or trajectory in the four dimensional attractor space maps to a two-dimensional trajectory, which cycles through
the four locations in a fixed order. We use this trajectory to generate forces that elicit pointing movements: See [87] and [23] for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002327.g002
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divided into proprioceptive (angular position) and affordance states
in the motor and premotor cortex respectively; cf., [92]. The
motor cortex sends top-down projections to the parietal cortex and
spinal-cord to suppress visual prediction errors and elicit motor
reflexes respectively. In contrast, the premotor cortex sends top-
down predictions about visual salience to the superior colliculus.
Predictions about second level causes and states have been
assigned to the basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex respectively.
These encode the set (sequential or random context) currently
inferred. The basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex exchange
predictions and prediction errors through cortico-subcortical
loops, while the basal ganglia exchanges signals with the premotor
cortex to optimise predictions about affordance. The blue arrows
arising from the substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area (SN/
VTA) are meant to indicate the main (dopaminergic) projections
from this area that we assume modulate the postsynaptic gain of
the principal cells (red circles) elaborating prediction errors. The
activities of these (nigrotectal, nigrostriatal and mesocortical)
dopaminergic projections encode the precision of prediction
errors at different levels of the sensorimotor hierarchy. Although
the recent literature on the (mesorhombencephalic) nigrotectal
pathway, from SN to the superior colliculus, focuses on
GABAergic projections, a substantial proportion of nigrotectal
projection neurons use dopamine [93], [94], [95].
Simulations
The model above is sufficient to engender cued reaching
movements, which are anticipatory if the agent correctly infers
that the cues are presented in a fixed (clockwise) sequence.
However, if we reverse the order of the stimuli, there should be
accuracy and reaction time costs, due to the fact that the sequence
cannot be predicted under clockwise beliefs about the sequence.
Furthermore, there should be a set switching cost as the hidden
states at the second (context) level are inferred and the itinerant
dynamics at the first (affordance) level are suppressed. When we
integrated Equation 1, this is precisely what was found:
Figure 5 shows the results of a simulation using log precisions of
four (a relatively high precision) throughout the hierarchy. In this
example, the target locations appeared every 12 time bins (of
64 ms) using Gaussian bump functions of time. The first five
targets were in the (expected) clockwise order, while last five were
Figure 3. This figure distinguishes between the equations of the generative model (left-hand side; see Equation 6) and the
equations generating sensory information (right-hand side; see Equation 5). The generative model is trying to predict the sensory states
produced by the equations on the right. These sensory states comprise the location of the agent’s arm in both proprioceptive (intrinsic) and
exteroceptive (extrinsic) coordinates. The locations of the four cues in the previous figure are shown in extrinsic coordinates in the lower right insert.
In addition to these sensory inputs, the agent also receives sensory information about the salience of cues at the four locations (e.g., illumination).
The equations of the generative model have been divided into those responsible for the selection or generation of a particular context or set and
those specifying the relative affordance of cue locations used to select action. Crucially, both sets of equations are based on winnerless competition
using the itinerant dynamics of the previous figure. These equations come to life when action (driving movements) becomes a function of
conditional expectations about hidden variables in the generative model. See main text for further details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002327.g003
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predictions and prediction errors are shown in the top four panels
of Figure 5, while the trajectory in extrinsic coordinates and the
underlying action are shown in the bottom panels (left and right
respectively). The upper left panel shows the conditional
predictions of sensory signals and sensory prediction errors (in
red). These are errors on the salience, proprioceptive and visual
input, which, as can be seen, are small in relation to predictions.
The predictions were based upon the hidden states shown on the
upper right. One can see the itinerant cycling over conditional
expectations of hidden affordances (large amplitude lines) that are
inferred with a high degree of conditional confidence (the grey
areas correspond to 90% Bayesian confidence intervals). The
interesting aspect of these results lie in the middle two panels that
show the conditional expectations of the hidden causes and states
at the second level, encoding the context or set. These results show
that it takes about two movements or trials before there is a
confident inference that the context has changed. This inferential
set switching is driven by the large (downward) deflection in
prediction error shown in red (left middle panel). Note that with
these precisions, behaviour is accurate and fast and that the
violation of sequential expectations is barely discernible. In other
words, the precision of sensory information is sufficient to override
top-down prior expectations of a sequential sort, when they are
Figure 4. This schematic illustrates the connections between prediction units (black) and error units (red) that underlie the
simulated reaching movements. The prediction units encode conditional expectations about hidden states and causes, while the error units
encode the associated prediction errors. The connections between these two sorts of units are specified by the message passing scheme in Equation
3 (cf., Figure 1). In brief, error units pass precision weighted prediction errors forward and horizontally (red connections), while prediction units sent
predictions backwards and horizontally (black connections). Note that prediction units only communicate with error units and vice versa. In this
figure, expectations about hidden states in the first level have been divided into two sets, corresponding to the position of the arm (motor cortex)
and the affordance of the cue locations (premotor cortex). The blue circle at the bottom of this figure indicates motor neurons in the ventral horn of
the spinal cord that mediate action. The cyan arrows represent various projections from the substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area (SN/VTA).
Exteroceptive sensory information enters directly at parietal cortex and the superior colliculus encoding positional information about the arm and the
salience of cue locations respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002327.g004
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performance cost in terms of reaction time and accuracy.
The same simulated neuronal responses are shown in Figure 6,
where they are shown alongside their associated brain structure.
This figure tries to illustrate how neuronal dynamics unfold at
different timescales in different parts of the brain to produce motor
behaviour. Crucially, all the hierarchically deployed dynamics are
both entrained by and entrain dynamics in lower levels, through
the recurrent message passing implicit in generalised predictive
coding. By design, we have placed the slower dynamics in higher
(more anterior) brain areas [96], [97], [98–99], [100]. The
neuroanatomical interpretation of this simulation should not be
taken too seriously but illustrates the fact that the scheme is (in
principle) biologically plausible, both in terms of its dynamical
formulation and the functional anatomy of sensorimotor hierar-
chies in the brain.
Summary
In summary, we have created a generative model that illustrates
the itinerant and dynamic sensorimotor constructs that might be
used by the brain to predict cued sequential behaviours and set
switching in response to changing contingencies. It is worth noting,
that this relatively simple model has implicitly modelled (and
integrated) a number of apparently disparate processes in cognitive
neuroscience: for example, Bayes-optimal sensorimotor integra-
tion, evidence accumulation, anticipation, short term (working)
memory, action selection, set switching and a simple form of
reversal learning (in terms of switching to a new contingency). We
mean this in the straightforward sense that to perform accurately,
the simulated agent has to remember the sequence of cues in terms
of delay period activity in the premotor and prefrontal cortex
[101], encoded here in terms of conditional beliefs about the
dynamics of hidden states. Furthermore, to respond optimally the
agent has to recognize a reversal in the sequence of cues and adjust
its internal representation of context accordingly. Interestingly,
[102] presents a model of working memory using exactly the same
winnerless (generalized Lotka-Volterra) dynamics used in this
paper. Using this model, they show that working memory capacity
has an upper bound of seven items, under plausible assumptions
about lateral neuronal interactions. Crucially, the cognitive
processes like working memory do not need to be modelled
explicitly but emerge from the Bayesian inversion of a generative
model. In future work, we will use the same model to study
learning and working memory; however, our current focus is on
how Bayes-optimal behaviour degrades when we reduce the
precision of prediction errors:
Results
Simulating dopaminergic depletion
In this section, we repeat the above simulations under different
levels of precision in the putative targets of dopaminergic
projections. This is meant to simulate depleted levels of dopamine;
acting at postsynaptic D1 receptors to reduce postsynaptic gain
(see Figure 1). First, we reduced the log precision (by 50% in 6
steps) in the principal cells of the superior colliculus that report
the prediction errors on the salience of target locations:
ln ~ P P(1,v)
a [f5,4:5,4...,2:5g.
The effects on conditional expectations of hidden states and
causes are shown in Figure 7 for high, intermediate and low levels
of precision (dopamine). The upper row shows the conditional
predictions of sensory input and sensory prediction errors as in
Figure 5, while the middle row shows the conditional expectations
of the hidden causes encoding context. The most remarkable thing
about these results is the failure to infer a change in the context (or
set) when dopamine is depleted. This results in an accumulation of
prediction error at the sensory level while, in contrast, the
prediction error at the second level (red lines in the middle panels)
decreases. This is an intuitive consequence of decreasing the
relative precision at lower levels of the hierarchical model, which
causes the inference to be over reliant upon top-down priors and
less confident about switching to the new context, when sensory
prediction errors are less precise.
This means that it takes longer before the second level
expectations accumulate sufficient evidence to make them switch,
following the reversal of stimulus order. At the lowest level of
simulated dopamine, this switch fails completely and the agent
Figure 5. This figure summarizes the results of simulations
under normal levels of dopamine (using a log precision of four
for all prediction errors). The conditional predictions and expecta-
tions are shown as functions of time over 128 time bins, each modeling
64 ms of time. The upper left panel shows the conditional predictions
(colored lines) and prediction errors (red lines) based upon the
expected in states on the upper right. In this panel and throughout,
the grey areas denote 90% Bayesian confidence intervals. The inferred
speed of itinerant cycling among affordance states corresponds to the
first of the hidden causes at the second level (left middle panel). These
hidden causes are a softmax function of their associated hidden states
(right middle panel). The blue lines encode a sequential context, while
the green lines encode the converse (random) context. The switching in
these conditional expectations occurs after sufficient sensory evidence
has accumulated following a reversal of the presentation order. The
lower left panel shows the trajectory (dotted lines) in an extrinsic frame
of reference, in relation to the cue locations (green circles), while the
lower right panel shows action in terms of horizontal and vertical
angular forces causing these movements.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002327.g005
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location. The behavioural consequences of this are shown gra-
phically in the lower panels of Figure 7, in terms of the trajectory of
movements over the ten cues (trials). We see here that the trajectory
is perturbed progressively as dopamine levels fall; with initial
directions being pulled in the direction of falsely anticipated target
locations. This is shown more clearly in Figure 8, which shows the
trajectory for the lowest level of dopamine. Duringthe first fivetrials
the initial excursion from the lower right target is in the correct
direction for the next target in the (clockwise) sequence. However,
after the reversal, the initial trajectory from the lower left target is
drawn towards the incorrectly anticipated next target, requiring a
corrective adjustment to the movement trajectory, when the actual
target discloses itself.
Figure 9 shows the behavioural consequences of this precision
or dopamine-dependent failure to correctly infer the sequential
context: the top panel shows the reaction times (assuming 64 ms
time bins) measured as the time from the onset of the cue to the
time at which the target was reached (to within a radius of
1
32
). The
corresponding spatial accuracy is shown in the lower panel as a
weighted average of the (inverse) distance to target during each
trial. There are two important things to take from these results:
First, irrespective of the level of dopamine, reaction times are
faster when the next cue can be anticipated. Furthermore, there is
a price to be paid for this anticipatory speeding, when sequential
anticipations are violated. This is reflected in the increased
reaction times at the point of sequence reversal for a couple of
trials. It is these transient decreases in performance that index the
switching costs hypothesised earlier. Crucially, the effect of
dopamine depletion is to exacerbate both the switching costs
and the behavioural slowing when sequential predictions no longer
hold. In the limit of very low dopamine, and a complete failure to
switch sets (infer a context change), there is a marked impairment
in performance that persists following reversal. Perhaps the most
important result in Figure 9 is that the set switching costs persist
for longer with low levels of dopamine. In other words, there is a
perseveration of (suboptimal) anticipatory motor trajectories that is
exacerbated by dopamine depletion. This latent bradykinesia and
Figure 6. This figure combines the dynamical results from the previous figure with the supposed functional anatomy in Figure 3. It
shows the conditional expectations about hidden states and causes associated with regionally specific representations. The dotted red time courses
associated with the prediction error units in the striatum show a set-related prediction error when the order of the cues was reversed (after the first
five presentations). It is these prediction errors that drive the switch in contextual expectations assigned to the prefrontal cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002327.g006
Active Inference and Affordance
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 12 January 2012 | Volume 8 | Issue 1 | e1002327perseveration is reminiscent of the symptoms of Parkinson’s
disease [103], [104], which was the motivation for these
simulations.
On the basis of these results, one might predict that the greatest
difference between Parkinson’s patients on and off dopaminergic
medication would be expressed most acutely in trials that violated
expectations established during sequential cueing. Conversely,
there should be relatively small differences in reaction times when
stimuli are presented in the correct sequence: cf., [105].
Furthermore, differences in reaction times with unpredictable
cues should not be marked, once patients have realised that there
is no underlying sequence. We will consider these predictions in
relation to empirical results in a forthcoming paper. It is also
interesting to relate these simulations to the results in [106], who
found deficits in probabilistic reversal learning in Parkinson’s
disease, where ‘‘patients also exhibited compromised adaptability to
the reversal’’. Brown and Marsden [107] investigated set switching
in Parkinson’s disease using the Stroop task. Subjects had to report
either the semantic or physical colour of a word; however, the rule
changed every ten trials. The response dimension was cued before
eachtrialorsubjectswerejust remindedtochangetheruleeveryten
trials. Patients showed general psychomotor slowing but were
further impaired on the uncued condition, especially in the first trial
following a rule change.
Finally, we repeated the simulated lesion experiments above by
reducing the precision in other cortical and subcortical structures
Figure 7. This figure shows the results of simulations under progressively reduced levels of precision (dopamine) as indicated by
the equalities in the lower row. The display format of these simulated responses is the same as used in the left panels of Figure 5 (conditional
predictions and prediction error; hidden contextual causes at the second level and motor trajectories). The left column presents the conditional
responses under normal levels of dopamine (as in Figure 5), while the middle and right columns show the equivalent responses for intermediate and
low levels of dopamine. As noted in the main text, the main features of these simulations are reciprocal changes in the amplitude of prediction errors
at the first and second levels that are associated with a progressive failure set switching (i.e., a failure to recognise that the order of stimulus
presentation no longer conforms to sequential expectations).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002327.g007
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shown in Figure 10 in terms of simulated reaction times over
different levels of dopamine: the left panels reproduce the reaction
time data of the previous figure, while the middle panel shows the
equivalent results obtained when depleting dopamine in the motor
cortex (encoding conditional expectations about proprioceptive
inputs). The effect of dopamine depletion here is to increase
reaction times in a non-specific way. This non-specific slowing was
expected, as proprioceptive prediction errors are subverted
thereby reducing motor vigour; cf., [108]. Note that inference
about affordance and set are not affected, because these are driven
by exteroceptive prediction errors. This means there is no change
in set switching or perseveration. Conversely, when we lesion
mesocortical projections to the premotor cortex (modulating
prediction errors about changes in affordance) there are effects on
both motor vigour and set switching (right hand panels).
Importantly, these effects differ from those produced by the same
lesion to the superior colliculus. Here, depleting dopamine actually
decreases reaction times. This is perfectly sensible because increasing
the precision at higher levels of a hierarchical model has the
opposite effect to increasing the precision of lower level prediction
errors. In other words, as dopamine levels in the premotor cortex
increase, the agent becomes overly confident about its top-down
(empirical) prior expectations, even in the face of precise sensory
information. This overconfidence is manifest in terms of a slight
impairment in reactions elicited by sensory cues. However, the
overconfidence about affordance enables the second level of the
generative model to recognise the change in context more efficiently
(quickly). This induces a trade-off between the efficiency with which
cues elicit movements and the efficiency of set switching.
Summary
In this section, we have seen how simulated dopamine depletion
is manifest in terms of neuronal responses encoding Bayes-optimal
inferences about sensorimotor contingencies and in terms of
behavior. The key point made by the simulations is that although
dopamine may have a singular mechanism of action and
computational function (e.g., to modulate postsynaptic gain and
encode precision) the physiological and behavioral correlates of
dopamine changes depend on where in the brain they are
Figure 8. This is a blow up of the motor trajectories under low
levels of dopamine from the previous figure. It highlights the fact
that when movements are in an expected clockwise direction, the initial
trajectory (dotted blue arrow) is directed towards the (correct) next
target location. Conversely, when the movements are in a counter
clockwise direction, the agent is initially confounded by false
expectations about which cue will appear next (dotted red arrow).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002327.g008
Figure 9. This figure presents the behavioral results from the
simulations under different levels of dopamine. The upper panel
shows the reaction times for each trial or cue as a function of cue order
(over 10 cues). The reaction time was measured as the time from cue
onset to the time that the pointing location fell within a small distance
of the target location. The equivalent results for accuracy are shown in
the lower panel in terms of the (inverse) average distance from the
pointing location to the target location for each trial. The colored lines
correspond to different levels of simulated dopamine; with red lines
indicating the lowest level and yellow lines the highest. The key things
to note here are: (i) the reaction time costs of unpredictable (first five),
relative to predictable trials (first five), shown by the yellow line and (ii)
the increase in amplitude and duration of switching costs as dopamine
is depleted (colored lines); modeled here in terms of the precision of
prediction errors on visual salience.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002327.g009
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understanding the role of dopamine may call for a multilateral
perspective that accommodates the delicate balance among
distributed responses that underlie the functional anatomy of
behavior. The simulations in this section can be regarded as a
proof of principle that a single mechanism can lead to the diverse
functional consequences seen empirically [109], [7], [110]. Here,
dopamine had opposite effects on the speed of movements
(bradykinesia) depending upon whether it was depleted at higher
or lower levels of the sensorimotor hierarchy. Conversely,
simulated depletion of dopamine in the superior colliculus (low-
level) and premotor cortex (high-level) had similar effects on
perseveration. We emphasize this point because it has implications
for the computational modeling of dopamine, especially for
theoretical accounts of dopamine that consider one optimization
process in isolation (for example, associating dopamine with
reward prediction error). A nice example of the plurality of deficits
following insults to be dopamine system is provided by [111], who
conclude that Parkinson’s ‘‘patients on and off medication both
showed attentional shifting deficits, but for different reasons.
Deficits in non-medicated patients were consistent with an
inability to update the new attentional set, whereas those in
medicated patients were evident when having to ignore distractors
that had previously been task relevant.’’
In summary, contrary to what is often assumed, dopamine may
not report the prediction error on value but the value (precision) of
prediction errors. If this is the case, one would anticipate different
behavioral deficits following dopamine depletion, depending on
which prediction errors were affected. Strategically, it may be
better to ask not what the function of dopamine tells you about a
model but what a model tells you about the function of dopamine.
In this paper, the function of dopamine is to modulate postsynaptic
gain, while the model mediates between this (neuronal) function
and its behavioral and neurophysiologic consequences. See also
[11].
Discussion
In this paper, we have presented a simple model of cued
reaching movements and set switching that is consistent with the
notions of salience and affordance. Furthermore, we have
simulated some latent symptoms of Parkinsonism by reducing
the precision of cues that have affordance. Reducing this precision
(dopamine) delays and can even preclude set switching, with
associated costs in behavioral accuracy. When the precision of
sensory cues is removed completely, we obtain autonomous
behavior that is prescribed by the itinerant expectations of the
agent (results not shown). Crucially, these simulations are not
based on an ad hoc model of dopaminergic function but use exactly
the same principles, equations and numerics used previously to
address a wide variety of processes in cognitive neuroscience:
Table 1 lists the growing number of paradigms and processes that
Figure 10. This figure represents behavioral results in terms of reaction times for depleting dopamine in three regions: the superior
colliculus encoding sensory salience (as in previous figure), the motor cortex encoding proprioception (middle column) and the
premotor cortex encoding affordance (right column). These results are shown using the same format as in previous figure and illustrate the
qualitatively different effects of dopamine depletion in different parts of the brain (or model). The lower panels indicate the implicit projections, from
the substantia nigra or ventral tegmental area, have been selectively depleted (where a red cross highlights the forward prediction errors affected).
The key thing to take from these simulations is that reducing the precision of prediction errors on sensory salience induces bradykinesia and
perseveration; whereas the equivalent reduction in proprioceptive affordance causes bradykinesia without perseveration. Finally, compromising the
precision of changes in affordance increases perseveration and decreases bradykinesia.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002327.g010
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hierarchical Bayesian inference. The simulations in this and
related papers can be reproduced from a graphical user interface
available in Matlab code (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/).
In short, we have focused on the role of dopamine in balancing
the influence of bottom-up sensory information and top-down
(empirical) prior expectations during perceptual inference and
consequent behavior. This role is consistent with many other
theoretical treatments of dopamine in modulating top-down effects
and signal-to-noise [49], [44], [11], [112], [2], [113], [45], [39],
[40]; and contextualizes them within the formal setting of
generalized predictive coding.
Functional anatomy and dopamine
The simulations presented in this paper do not attempt to cover
all the physiological and computational processes that dopamine
may mediate. Our results pertain to classical neuromodulatory
postsynaptic consequences of changes in tonic dopamine release
(e.g., during depletion due to drugs or disease) on principal cells.
There are many aspects of dopaminergic function that are not
addressed by these simulations: for example, modulation of long-
term synaptic plasticity, or the differential roles of various pre- and
postsynaptic dopamine receptors. Furthermore, we have only
considered the effect of tonic or baseline dopamine levels (over
long time scales) and have ignored dopamine fluctuations on a
shorter time scale: for example, the phasic release of dopamine in
response to specific cues or its rapid clearance in the striatum by
the dopamine active transporter. However, the aim of the present
work was to highlight the computational, neurophysiologic and
anatomic considerations that suggest a unitary role for dopamine
in the encoding of precision.
There is a large literature on modeling dopamine in the context
of choice and motor behavior [114], [115], [116], [117], [118],
[119]. Some of this literature is based on reinforcement learning
and optimal decision theory; and formulated at a rather abstract
level in terms of discrete state spaces and time. It is difficult to
connect the (predictive coding) process model provided in this
paper with the more descriptive (but useful) heuristics provided by
reinforcement learning and economics. One link may be via
variational Bayesian formulations of reinforcement-learning up-
date equations (see below), in which precision-weighted prediction
errors play a key role [120]. On the other hand, there are
computational simulations whose biological detail goes beyond the
simulations in this paper [112], [121], [122], [123]. In this sense,
the simulations reported here should be regarded as an illustration
of how far one can get in modeling neuromodulation in the larger
setting of Bayes optimal action and perception. In this context,
Bayes optimality (implicit in free energy minimization) replaces
optimal control (implicit in reinforcement or value learning).
The ideas and simulations in this paper just show that dopamine
fits comfortably into a principled if somewhat abstract formulation
of action and perception. Specifically, it has the physiological
characteristics that would be required to fulfill a central role in
Bayes-optimal inference; namely, to encode precision or uncer-
tainty. This is why we have focused on the neuromodulation of
postsynaptic gain in cortical cells, mediated by D1 receptors. The
theoretical constraints we have considered do not really allow us to
say very much about the functional anatomy of the cortico-basal
ganglia-thalamic loops. Having said this, the dynamics necessary
for active inference are not inconsistent with many aspects of
known functional anatomy. For example, the basal ganglia are
believed to act on cortex through a process of focused disinhibition
[124]. In particular, the basal ganglia output nuclei fire tonically to
inhibit cortical activity, but strong striatal activity can reduce this
tonic activity to release target thalamic areas and their
corresponding cortical areas from inhibition. This basic functional
architecture is reflected in our simulations by the selection of an
appropriate sensorimotor set by representations of hidden causes
in the striatum that selectively enable particular attractors or
central pattern generators in premotor cortex. Note that focused
disinhibition is a necessary consequence of the dynamics on
hidden states and causes that mediate winnerless competition. In
one sense, it is difficult to imagine any alternative sort of dynamics
that could prescribe unique sequential behavior and motor
trajectories.
Although the computations that minimize free energy do not
predict the details of functional anatomy (in the same way that
maximizing adaptive fitness does not predict the details of a
phenotype), it does provide some interesting insights into large-
scale functional anatomy. These insights rest upon the notion that
the brain is a generative model of its environment. This means that
causal regularities in the environment should be recapitulated in its
neuroanatomy. The trick here is to think of the brain as generating
predictions of sensory input using its backward (top-down)
connections; in other words, to imagine the brain without the
forward connections that are used for perceptual inversion of its
generative model. The picture that emerges is a fine lacework of
cortical projections from high-order associative cortex that radiate
to sensory cortical areas and then send top-down predictions of
sensory input to thalamic nuclei. A nice example here is the
distinction between what and where pathways in visual processing
[125]. Their very existence suggests that the (hidden) causes of
visual inputs to the lateral geniculate nucleus are objects that can
belong to different categories and, crucially, can be in different
places. One might imagine that in a static universe, where objects
were bound to a particular place, the brain would not have
separate representations of what and where or their neuroana-
tomical correlates. So what does this sort of analysis imply for the
basal ganglia? We will focus on three specific predictions:
First, the fact that the outputs of the basal ganglia are to
thalamic nuclei suggests that the basal ganglia are at a
hierarchically lower level than prefrontal cortex. For example,
the ventral lateral nucleus receives inputs from the basal ganglia
(via the thalamic fasciculus) and sends outputs to the primary
motor cortex. The ventral lateral nucleus is juxtaposed to the
ventral posterolateral nucleus in receipt of proprioceptive and
somatosensory afferents via the posterior column-medial lemniscus
pathway. The implicit hierarchical level of the basal ganglia
suggests that the prefrontal cortical projections to the striatum
should be of the backwards type (originating from deep pyramidal
cells). Indeed, the cortical pyramidal neurons projecting to the
striatum are located in layers II–VI, but the densest projections
come from layer V [126]. Furthermore, the medium spiny neurons
that receive these corticostriatal projections express dopaminergic
(D1 - direct and D2 - indirect pathway) receptors [127]; as would
be expected, if they played the role of prediction error units that
are targeted by backward connections.
Second, in active inference, the balance between top-down prior
beliefs and bottom-up sensory information is controlled by the
relative precision of prediction errors at higher and lower levels of
cortico-basal ganglia-thalamic hierarchy. This suggests that there
will be an antagonistic control of dopaminergic projections to the
prefrontal cortex (higher level) and equivalent projections to the
striatal (lower-level). In anatomical terms, this may be reflected in
the segregation of the cells of origin of the nigrostriatal dopamine
projections (from the substantia nigra) and the cortical projections
(from the ventral tegmental area). Clearly, there are several
important functional associations in dopaminergic systems that
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examples here include the opposing effects of the direct and
indirect pathways [128,129] and the opposing influences of
dopamine on synaptic plasticity [56].
Finally, it is interesting to note that the number of parameters of
statistical models is generally much greater than the degrees of
freedom of their variance or precision estimates. For example, a
classical statistical model with both between and within subject
factors can have hundreds of parameters yet can be inverted using
just two precisions (modeling within and between subject
variability). This might be a simple explanation for the fact that
the number of dopaminergic cells (encoding precision or context)
is much smaller than the myriad of cells (encoding hidden causes
or content) needed to parameterize the world.
Prior beliefs or rewards?
The current work presents a covert challenge to standard
theories of decision-making and motor control based upon the
concept of reward or value. As hinted at in the introduction, there
is an inherent circularity in reward-based accounts of behavior
that may obscure deeper questions about behavior. This is because
(psychological) reward is defined as a process that reinforces or
modifies behavior. As such, it is circular to use reward to explain
behavior. Although the concept of reward may provide beautifully
self-consistent descriptions of behavior in terms of optimizing
expected reward; e.g., [20], reward-based accounts (and their
neurophysiologic correlates) cannot explain behavior per se. The
alternative and simpler approach, provided by active inference,
replaces rewards with prior beliefs about how the world should
unfold and motivates these priors in evolutionary and ethological
terms. Put simply, survival does not depend on seeking out
rewards; it depends upon avoiding surprising encounters and
physiological states that are uncharacteristic of a given phenotype.
It is therefore sufficient to minimize surprise (free energy), which is
a problem of (active) inference, not reinforcement learning.
At no point in the formulation above do we refer to reward or
value; the only optimization was to minimize surprise about
expected outcomes. In the context of hierarchical inference, the
potentially potent role of dopamine is obvious. This is because the
delicate mixing of bottom-up sensory information, with top-down
priors, to produce conditional beliefs (and action) is exquisitely
sensitive to the precision or certainty ascribed to representations at
different levels of a hierarchy. This is a generic and ubiquitous
aspect of hierarchical inference; for example, inference about
treatment effects in group studies rests on veridical estimates of
within-subject, relative to between-subject variability (precision).
The idea here is that dopamine reports the precision (variability) in
hierarchical models used by the brain to infer the causes of sensory
data. In this view, the task instructions and cues provided to
subjects in decision-making experiments do not, in themselves,
constitute rewards but are used to instill prior beliefs about how
they should behave.
Although we have questioned the epistemological status of
reward on the grounds of circularity, one cannot deny that certain
cues are inherently rewarding; for example, those induced by
appetitive stimuli. In this sense, one might associate reward with
the affordance of (hidden) causes in the environment that elicit
obligatory volitional and autonomic responses. In this context, the
tautology of reward is resolved by noting that reward is a
perceptual attribute of a cue not a cause of behavior: in active
inference, behavior is caused by prior beliefs and ensuing
exchange with environment. These beliefs ensure certain states
are occupied frequently, where these states are, by definition,
valuable. In this view, value and reward are consequences not
causes of behavior. Behavior is caused by the environment and
prior beliefs that are established epigenetically or through
experience dependent learning. This means that reward is a
perceptual (hedonic) consequence of behavior, not a cause.
The argument in this paper is that the information (prediction
error) conveyed by rewarding cues cannot be encoded by
dopamine, because dopamine cannot excite postsynaptic the
responses that would be needed to mediate the influence of that
information: Dopamine can only modulate the postsynaptic
responses to glutamatergic or other neurotransmitter release. This
is not to say that rewarding cues will not excite dopamine cells.
Indeed, this is the hypothesis put forward here – namely that
rewards or cues with particular affordance can select exterocep-
tive, interoceptive and proprioceptive processing channels that
mediate behavioral responses. In short, dopamine may report the
precision or confidence about reward, not reward per se. This
account may explain why dopaminergic responses do not behave
as reward prediction errors generally. For example, a significant
proportion of dopamine neurons increase their firing to aversive
stimuli, and cues which predict them [130], [131]. This is the
opposite behavior to that predicted by the reward prediction error
hypothesis, but follows naturally from the precision encoding
framework, since both aversive and appetitive cues signal
predictable sensorimotor sequelae. The precision hypothesis also
accounts for the finding that dopaminergic neurons fire in
response to stimuli that predict the subsequent availability of
predictive information about upcoming reward, even though such
stimuli convey no information about the reward itself [132]. On
the account presented in this paper, such stimuli elicit dopami-
nergic activity because they signal the onset of a predictable
sequence of events. Accounting for all observed patterns of
dopaminergic activity falls outside the scope of this paper, but it is
clear that the precision hypothesis predicts the involvement of
dopamine in a broader range of processes than some existing
accounts.
The simulations in this paper focused on the depletion of
dopamine. However, increasing levels of, or sensitivity to,
dopamine in the basal ganglia has been implicated in several
movement disorders, including tardive dyskinesia [133], Hunting-
ton’s disease [134], Tourette syndrome [135], hemiballismus [136]
and levodopa-induced dyskinesia [137]. These disorders produce
involuntary, non-purposeful movements that are nonetheless more
structured than simple myoclonic jerks or tremor. If dopaminergic
transmission was increased pathologically in lower levels of the
hierarchy, fluctuations in ascending (afferent) prediction errors
could become sufficiently precise (potent) to trigger movement; in
other words, subliminal cues would be awarded aberrant
affordance and elicit inappropriate action.
Precision and learning rates
Although we have not dealt with the phasic release of dopamine
and the implicit optimization of precision, the current formulation
does make some strong predictions about the modulation of
stimulus bound or event related responses. If tonic dopaminergic
levels modulate postsynaptic gain, one would expect to see
amplified responses in the post synaptic targets of dopamine
projections that report (sensory) prediction errors. This means that
one might expect greater evoked responses to the same stimuli
when presented in a predictable, as opposed to an unpredictable
context. Indeed, this is the basis of an explanation for the
mismatch negativity: an increase in the event related potential
elicited by a novel or oddball stimulus, presented in a predictable
train of stimuli. The proposed mechanism rests on prediction
errors that are afforded too much precision [138].
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emerges from other computational perspectives. For example, one
can formulate dynamic inference about the causes of sensory cues
without reference to neurobiology but as a generic hierarchical
Bayesian model [120]. Variational Bayesian methods then yield
the same sort of precision-weighted prediction errors as in the
present work. Crucially, the variational update equations are
formally related to reinforcement learning rules; where precisions
play the role of learning rates. This means that one could test
whether dopaminergic drug manipulations affect estimates of
precision (learning rates) based on empirical behavioral responses
during classical reinforcement learning paradigms.
We have not touched upon learning per se, because we have
assumed that the prior beliefs used to generate behavior were
already known in the simulations. In future work, we will use the
simulations above to look at the acquisition of prior beliefs in terms
of sequence learning and the effect that dopamine has on this
learning. The key issue here is that any effects of dopamine on
learning and activity-dependent plasticity (using free energy
minimization) are mediated vicariously through its effects on
neuronal activity. This means that the only thing specific about
dopamine, in the context of learning, is due to the restriction of its
projections to the (extended) motor system. This suggests that
sensory learning will be largely unaffected by dopaminergic
manipulations (simulated or real) to the extent that it is
independent of motor learning. We will explore this in future
work, in which we will treat (phasic) dopamine release as encoding
state-dependent precision, given contextual cues like conditioned
stimuli: see [132]. Formally, this is closely related to the use of
state-dependent precision to understand attentional gain in
perception [30].
One interesting aspect of the simulations in this paper is that
they lend themselves nicely to higher-order (operant) learning
paradigms: The behavior generated by high-level sensorimotor
constructs does not distinguish between sensations caused by
motor acts or vice versa, because distinct exteroceptive and motor
predictions only arise at lower (sensory) levels of the hierarchy. In
other words, we could regard the simulations above as simulations
of actions that disclose salient cues (as opposed to salient cues
causing action). This perspective may be useful when trying to
understand the central role of dopamine in action selection based
upon conditioned stimuli on the one hand, and optimizing
behavior to access conditioned reinforcers on the other.
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